Mirror The Body, Mirror The Emotion
In their study, Evidence for mirror systems in emotions,1 Bastiaansen et al., examine the relationship between mirror systems and embodied simulation.
This examination highlights and advances the connections between body changes, emotions and the simulation of body changes and emotions. These systems also play a significant role in the creation of consciousness.2 The neuroscientific sense of body-mind connection provides great insight into the development of resilience and cultivation of well-being - the two main topics for this blog.
Emotion is the basis for the neuroscientific sense of body-mind connection. An emotion is a physical event in the body. See a large object hurdling rapidly at your head, and your body changes - heart beat accelerates, muscles tense, blood flow accelerates to the legs, time sensation dilates, and the head and face react - head draws back, eyes widen, mouth opens, lips grimace, eyebrows push up in the middle. You fear.
When another body acts out an emotion, what happens to our body?
From Bastiaansen et al.:
Observing the actions and tactile sensations of others activates premotor, posterior parietal and somatosensory regions in the brain [systems for sensing and moving the body] of the observer which are also active when performing similar movements and feeling similar sensations.
In other words, what we see in the body of others, occurs similarly in the neural maps of our own body. It is as if the physical experience we observe is happening to us.
One noteworthy exception: The simulation does not engage the earliest stage of somatosensory procession. This stage is reserved for our own body emotions. We duck when the hurling object flies at our head, but do not duck (although we might wince in sympathy) when the hurling object flies at someone else’s head.
From Bastiaansen et al.:
Seeing the emotions of others also recruits regions involved in experiencing similar emotions... Emotion simulation seems to involve a mosaic of affective, motor and somatosensory components [instead of simply mapping one observed emotion to one specific brain system].
We do not act exactly as others act, and we do not emote exactly as other emote. If an emotion dictates the automatic behavior of others, it triggers a more generalized simulation (and more generalize awareness of the event) in us. Our response is empathic rather than specific. The quality of our empathy relates to quality of our own simulation. Similarly, two people observing the emotion of a third person, will have different empathic experiences.
From Bastiaansen et al.:
Recent experimental evidence suggests that motor simulation may be a trigger for the simulation of associated feeling states. This mosaic of simulations may be necessary for generating the compelling insights [my ital.] we have into the feelings of others. Through their integration with, and modulation by, higher cognitive functions, they could be at the core of important social functions, including empathy, mind reading and social learning.
In other words, simulations in our body trigger simulations of feelings. This pathway generates “compelling insights” valuable for our social behavior. We understand others through simulating our own experience of the events and emotions of others.
We are emotional about the emotions of other. Our body changes in a direct relationship to the body-state changes of others. This relationship is evolutionarily advantageous. For example, if after eating, one person starts throwing up, we should all throw up to expel potential poisons from our bodies.
Evolution provides for a) emotion and b) simulated emotions about the emotions of others. These systems developed before the systems needed to create a mental experience of these body events. Emotion, empathy and theory of mind evolved first.
It is highly likely that the development of consciousness is significantly based on the ability to simulate emotions about emotions. If changes to our body-state is the basis for having emotions about emotions, our body-state changes are also the basis of consciousness. How our body experiences an event is a precursor to our mental experience of an event.
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Bastiaansen JA, Thioux M, & Keysers C (2009). Evidence for mirror systems in emotions. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 364 (1528), 2391-404 PMID: 19620110
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Antonio Damasio provides the most well developed, accessible discussion of the body-mind connection and the creation of consciousness.
Damasio, A. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. Harvest Books; 2000. ↩
Musings
Reader Comments (6)
Great stuff! I have read about mirror neurons and primal empathy before in Daniel Goleman's book "Social Intelligence." In the book, he says how our brains are "wired to connect," which to me is great neuroscientific evidence of the Buddha's own teachings on the interconnectedness between self and other.
Towards the end you write,
"Evolution provides for a) emotion and b) simulated emotions about the emotions of others. These systems developed before the systems needed to create a mental experience of these body events. Emotion, empathy and theory of mind evolved first."
I am not sure how true this claim is. Although I see how theory of mind, emotions, and empathy fall neatly into an evolutionary framework, I don't see how these predate consciousness itself.
This probably has to do with our different views on what consciousness is - but to me any being with a brain has consciousness, and therefore an internal world of mental experience. My basic, commonsense theory on this is that when we learn, we learn in relation to our self, and this concept or sense of a self is what consciousness is. So I would argue that consciousness comes before empathy and even emotions themselves. Without consciousness (or a sense of self), emotions wouldn't be able to reference what is hungry, sad, angry, hurt, etc. Only when we conceive that "I am hungry" or "I am angry" does the emotion have any meaning, purpose, and drive (for survival, reproduction, or what-have-you).
I suppose I could imagine a primitive being with a brain but no consciousness or sense of self. They could detect "there is hunger" or "there is hurt," but then I fail to see how this can translate into action without there being some sense of self?
You might then say that machines can still act despite no sense of self. Then I could say "but they are programmed to act in a certain way," and then you could counter with, "but evolution too has programmed us to act in certain ways." But I do think there is a distinct difference in the software.
Living things, with the recognition of their environment, program themselves to adapt. We still have difficulty teaching machines how to teach themselves in the same way even a dog or rabbit spontaneously builds associations regarding its surroundings.
I think the key difference is this: I see consciousness as a fundamental starting point of mind, while modern science likes to see consciousness as a byproduct of mind.
I think I will stop rambling now...it is always fun to think about these things. I am always driven to take a more phenomenal approach to understanding consciousness but I think neuroscience will play an integral part in helping us uncover what consciousness really is.
Couple clarifications:
"Only when we conceive that "I am hungry" or "I am angry" does the emotion have any meaning, purpose, and drive (for survival, reproduction, or what-have-you)."
This can be a conscious or unconscious process. I believe beings can still have a sense of self even if they don't consciously think, "Damn....I am kinda feeling hungry for another small rat."
So...while it is this sense of self that creates consciousness, our CONCEPT of self can be unconscious. Dogs, birds, fish I would argue have an unconscious sense of self, of which they [obviously] aren't conceptually aware of.
Secondly, I wrote:
"You might then say that machines can still act despite no sense of self. Then I could say "but they are programmed to act in a certain way," and then you could counter with, "but evolution too has programmed us to act in certain ways." But I do think there is a distinct difference in the software."
I should probably say there is a difference in the hardware too if I wanted to be more accurate.
OK - DONE RAMBLING!
Thanks for your awesome comment! I enjoyed reading your theory about consciousness. I believe we are meant to contemplate two different versions of consciousness, and these perspectives both are innate.
You write as an intuitive psychologist. It's a great thing. When I write about the phenomenon of consciousness, your intuition overrides the carefully worded dissection. In other words, quoting Mark Twain:
"Analyzing humor is like dissecting a frog. Few people are interested and the frog dies of it."
Now some points...
RE: evolution
If one bird flies off, all birds do. If one prairie dog ducks into its whole, they all do. If the alpha male of a primitive species threatens, the other males scramble. These are examples of survival behavior based on information gather from the bodies of others. Species mirror body states well before they have a central nervous system capable of what neuroscientists define as feeling or thought. I was lazy to find the proper citation, but I believe my point would be supported by the literature of evolutional biology and psychology.
RE: feelings or thoughts.
Before the neuroscientific capacity of feelings or thoughts exists, experience is simply the flow of events in the body. Organisms, even without the capacity for feelings or thoughts, can adapt to and learn from these experiences. The development of a mirror-neuron-system allows an organism to modify its body according the the state of another organisms body. So the experience of one become part of the experience of another.
Only after an organism has the capacity to mirror its own body states could it be reasonably said to have the capacity to have feelings (mental experiences) about emotions (physical body changes) [these are neuroscientific definitions]. Feelings are the basis for other mental experiences - thought and consciousness [more neuroscience].
RE: intuitive psychology
Our species has many innate knowledge sets. One of them is intuitive psychology. We are born with the significant disposition to view life as our essence and our body. We see our shell of flesh as nothing more than a meat puppet. I believe this point of view is far more important a topic than the underlying science. It's how we are. We get this way not because we choose so; rather, because our genome says so. Nature is not without irony.
Neuroscience, and increasingly psychology is turning against the qualities of intuitive psychology. The science might become more true, but ironically, less accessible and insightful. It's like what happens once the study of physics gets so complicated it no longer makes sense (we have an innate sense of intuitive physics as well).
To write about psychology from our innate intuitive sense of it is to strive to develop insight accessible to all who live life, rather than for a specialized set of highly trained readers.
You are on the right path. I try to write from both perspectives, and believe me when I tell you, the writing is damn hard.
RE: Innate
Genes provide for a mirror neuron system just as they provide for arms. Genes provide for a sense of psychology and biology (and many other things). For example, humans are scared of snakes even if they have never seen one. If you call that instinct, which it is, a large collection category-specific, fuzzy-ish instincts would constitute 'intuitive knowledge of that category.'
Thanks again for the awesome comment!
Thank you for the information Cole! I really like your blog and the fact that you cite so much science (it is something I wish I could do more of but I never have the patience to tip-toe through all the language).
Just added you to my "Recommended Sites" list.
Oh, but one little question: does neuroscience distinguish between feelings and sensations? And how exactly does neuroscience define consciousness to begin with? I know it has its fair share of controversy within the field.
In neuroscience, sensations are body events. Feelings are mental events (about qualities of the body state).
Neuroscience has theories and variation on theories about consciousness. For my blog, I use perhaps the most prominent theory as give. Antonio Damasio writes at length about it in his three books Descartes Error, The Feeling of What Happens and Looking for Spinoza.